"In my view, the changes introduced through the 26th and 27th Constitutional Amendments have compromised the autonomy and institutional integrity of the High Courts. I have witnessed the growing influence of the executive on judicial institutions, which now extends to the appointment and transfer of judges."
This is a serious and thought-provoking stance. Let us examine this perspective through a constitutional, legal, and historical lens.
Justice Mohsin Akhtar Kayani was among the most senior judges of the Islamabad High Court and was in line to become the Chief Justice following the elevation of former Chief Justice عامر فاروق (Aamir Farooq) to the Supreme Court. However, following the 26th and 27th Constitutional Amendments, the transfer of Justice Sarfraz Dogar from the Lahore High Court altered the seniority order in the Islamabad High Court, making Justice Sarfraz Dogar a judge there (and consequently a front-runner for the Chief Justice position).
While his concern that these amendments have increased executive influence appears valid in the context of the Islamabad High Court, several questions arise:
1. Was there no executive interference in the judiciary previously?
2. Why did the legislature find these amendments necessary?
3. Did administrative and judicial powers not affect the course of justice in the past?
To understand this situation, it is necessary to compare the circumstances before and after the constitutional amendments. Under the previous system, judicial transfers were largely restricted to provincial limits, specifically among High Courts and their respective benches. Consequently, appointments and seniority remained an internal matter of the respective High Courts.
Following these amendments, while the basic procedure for fresh appointments remained unchanged, the scope of judicial transfers was expanded across all High Courts. This directly affected administrative powers concerning the appointment and transfer of High Court Chief Justices. Although the approval of the respective High Court Chief Justices is still required for such transfers, executive interference in the process cannot be denied.
A review of historical facts reveals that questions regarding the administrative powers of Chief Justices or the formation of benches have frequently been raised in the past. The creation of "like-minded judge benches" and their approach to justice form a regrettable chapter in Pakistan's judicial history. Verdicts often became predictable upon the formation of benches, and those predictions frequently proved accurate.
Throughout the country's history, alongside traditions of removing judges for failing to deliver verdicts favored by the establishment, there is also a clear history of dismissing elected prime ministers and members of assemblies through the judiciary. Evidence of collusion between politicians and judges has also come to light over time.
Appointments of High Court judges have often been subject to political influence, recommendations, and intense personal ambitions. Instances of delivering verdicts through contradictory interpretations of the constitution and having preferred cases assigned to oneself are well-documented. Consequently, the ensuing tension between the judiciary and the legislature plunged national affairs into continuous uncertainty.
Justice Mohsin Akhtar Kayani and other judges of the Islamabad High Court also challenged the new amendments and transfer laws in the Constitutional Bench. In June 2025, the Supreme Court's Constitutional Bench, through a majority verdict, declared the transfer of judges under Article 200 of the Constitution to be constitutional and legal, ruling that it cannot be construed as a fresh appointment. Following this decision, the Judicial Commission transferred him to the Lahore High Court in April 2026 under the 27th Amendment, which intensified the seniority dispute.
Furthermore, in March 2024, six judges of the Islamabad High Court—including Justice Mohsin Akhtar Kayani—wrote a letter to the members of the Supreme Judicial Council detailing interference by intelligence agencies in judicial affairs, along with attempts to pressure judges through the harassment and surveillance of their families. However, when Justice Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui raised similar grave allegations in the past, the silence of other judges at the time remains a glaring question mark.
It is also worth noting that certain corruption-related references were pending against the resigning judge in the Supreme Judicial Council, and he resigned without awaiting their final verdict.
If public trust in the judiciary has eroded today, or if concerns are raised over the imbalance of administrative powers, the responsibility cannot be placed solely on the legislature or the executive. The judiciary's own decisions, internal divisions, and lack of self-accountability have played a significant role in creating this crisis.